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Abstract:  In recent decades, one of the objectives of international development assistance has
been to encourage developing country governments to reorient their economies from highly
regulated and centrally controlled to deregulated and market-based.  However, poor economic
performance on its own might well necessitate such a shift.  Does aid from donors accelerate this
process by providing additional incentives and critical resources (finance and advice)?  Or do
donor funds slow the retreat of the state by lessening financial crises and indirectly promoting
state control (e.g., through state-run development projects)?  This paper contributes to the
empirical analysis of this question by examining the link between aid flows and regulatory
burden.  Using an instrumental variables method on panel data from 71 aid receiving countries
from 1970 to 1995, estimation results support the first position.  Donor funds favor more heavily
regulated economies and successfully promoted deregulation.  This apparent example of
successful conditionality points to the importance of a more disaggregate analysis of the
interaction of aid and policy in developing countries.
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1I.  Introduction
In recent decades, one of the central objectives of international aid agencies has been to
encourage developing country governments to reorient their economies from highly regulated
and centrally controlled to deregulated and market-based.  However, poor economic performance
on its own might well necessitate such a shift.  Does aid from donors accelerate this process by
providing additional incentives and critical resources (finance and advice)?  Or do donor funds
slow the retreat of the state by lessening financial crises and indirectly promoting state control
(e.g., through state-run development projects)?  This paper contributes to the empirical analysis
of this question through an econometric study of aid flows and regulatory burden.
The key issue in estimating this relationship is a potential endogeneity problem.  While
aid may result in an improved regulatory environment (if donors are successful in this objective),
the allocation of aid itself may be conditional on regulation. As the questions above make clear,
we do not know a priori if aid reduces or sustains regulation.  Nor do we know if donors target
highly regulated economies (consistent with traditional conditionality) or favor already
deregulated ones (selectivity).  Whichever direction these causal links take, estimation of the
impact of regulation on aid allocation and of aid on the level of regulation must address
endogeneity.
This paper uses instrumental variables methods to estimate separate aid and regulation
equations using panel data from 71 aid receiving countries from 1970 to 1995.  The measure of
regulation is a component of the Fraser Institute’s “Economic Freedom in the World” series. 
The estimated aid allocation equation reveals that, ceteris paribus, more aid flows to heavily
regulated economies, perhaps reflecting the use of conditionality.  The estimated regulation
equation suggests such conditionality has been effective: aid consistently appears to lower
2regulation.  The apparent contradiction between these findings and recent harsh assessments of
conditionality more broadly may be explained by omitted variable bias in the latter.  In analyses
that examine only a single, broad measure of policy, the response to one component may mask
the response to another component. Overall, the results of this paper point to the importance of a
more disaggregate analysis of the interaction of aid and policy in developing countries.
Section II reviews the relevant previous research, focusing on empirical studies of aid,
regulation and related topics and identifying potential instruments for regulation and aid. 
Section III presents the data and model to be estimated.  Section IV discusses results for different
specifications, samples, and estimation techniques.  Section V concludes.
II.  Previous Research
The recent literature on foreign aid often questions whether aid achieves its stated goals. 
While donor agencies such as the World Bank and USAID advocate policy reform through
structural adjustment packages, a substantial body of research finds these methods ineffective for
a number of reasons.  Donors appear reluctant to enforce conditions attached to loans and grants
(e.g, Mosley et al., 1995).  One explanation is the so-called Samaritan problem.  For a
sufficiently altruistic donor, giving aid is a dominant strategy.  Given this knowledge, donor
threats to make aid conditional on policy reform are not credible and the recipient government’s
reform decision is unaffected (Svensson, 2000B).  A less sympathetic critique suggests aid may
be self-serving rather altruistic.  Bureaucratic budget mechanisms, “defensive lending,” and
promotion of donor economic and strategic interests may create an imperative to dispense aid
(Fleck and Kilby, 2001; Mosley et al., 1995; Svensson, 2003; Tendler, 1975).
An even harsher challenge maintains that aid funds work against reform (e.g.,
Boockmann and Dreher, 2003).  A country’s current policies reflect the outcome of a political
3process that balances competing interests.  Radical policy change (e.g., economic reform) is
unlikely until the status quo no longer is feasible because of currency or debt crisis.  Foreign aid
provides the state with additional resources–hard currency, new loans, debt relief–and potentially
staves-off the day of reckoning.  According to this line of reasoning, if donors do not hold fast to
their reform conditions, aid will delay policy change and, as Casella and Eichengreen (1996)
point out, this can make the net effect of aid negative.  Even if donors do require some changes,
these may be less extreme than the measures the recipient government would have been forced to
adopt without the cushion of aid.  Taking this argument one step further, a potential aid recipient
may strategically avoid reform to attract aid.  If more aid flows to countries where development
is stalled, a government that benefits more from aid than from growth has an incentive to impede
reform to attract more aid (Collier, 1997).
Arguments in favor of adjustment assistance focus on economic dynamics as well as
political aspects of the reform process.  Such arguments are the traditional justifications given by
international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF.  External funding may shield the
country as a whole from negative short-run effects of policy reform, smooth the flow of
resources from contracting sectors to expanding sectors (through training, transitional assistance,
etc.) or serve as the up-front investment needed to privatize state-owned enterprises. 
Macroeconomic stabilization provided by aid may be a prerequisite for the private investment
(domestic and foreign) needed to fuel expansion in areas of comparative advantage, the route by
which growth is restarted.  Aid may provide technical assistance for appropriate deregulation. 
An alternative political economy perspective argues that distributing benefits (such as aid funds)
may “buy support.”  Such benefits can include  a generous severance package to quell unrest
among former public sector employees, compensation for powerful business elites now exposed
1Ironically, BD find no significant endogeneity problem–aid allocation does not depend on
growth.  This suggests that the earlier literature on aid effectiveness may be worth revisiting.
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to competition, postponing tax compliance efforts, etc. (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Blanchard,
1996; Fleck, 2000; Rodrik, 1996).  The key is that more resources in the control of committed
reformers promotes reform.  Because the country is in crisis, it does not have access to
international credit markets and must rely on aid.
These debates are the launching point for the extensive literature on aid effectiveness. 
Research on aid effectiveness at the World Bank and elsewhere culminated in the publication of
Assessing Aid (World Bank, 1998) and a subsequent article in the American Economics Review
entitled “Aid, Policies and Growth” (Burnside and Dollar, 2000–henceforth BD).  Earlier
attempts to assess the impact of aid on economic growth were plagued by questions of the
direction of causation since aid allocation itself may depend on growth.  A potential solution to
this problem came in Boone (1996).  He notes that the extensive literature on aid allocation finds
three motives for giving aid:  humanitarian, commercial, and geopolitical.  Since aid allocated
for humanitarian reasons may depend on growth, Boone constructs instruments using variables
reflecting only the geopolitical and commercial motives.  Using this approach, Boone finds aid
ineffective.  BD take the analysis one step further, exploring the interaction of aid and policy.1 
They find that aid is effective in “good policy” environments but ineffective otherwise.  BD also
report that:  1) aid has generally not been targeted at “good policy” countries; 2) aid does not
change policy (using an aggregate policy index); and 3) aid is associated with increased
government consumption due to fungibility.  Assessing Aid as well as several other articles from
the same World Bank research group (e.g., Collier, 1997; Collier and Dollar, 2001) advocate a
policy of aid selectivity, i.e., ex post conditionality whereby substantial aid is given to a country
2At least on paper.  The administrative structure of the implementing agency (the Millennium
Challenge Corporation) holds out the possibility that the MCA will divert resources and control from
USAID to the State Department and the Treasury.  See Brainard et al. (2003) for a discussion of the
agency structure and Lucas and Radelet (2004) for an analysis of the first year’s selection process.
3As Banerjee and Rondinelli (2003, 1528) note: “Although the literature on the effects of foreign
aid on economic growth and development is large and growing, analysis of its impacts on economic
reforms in general, and on specific reform policies such as privatization, is still nascent.”
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only after a number of years of reform.  This precludes the possibility of feigned reforms and
reversals and ostensibly has incentive effects for other countries since the rewards of reform are
greater.  This selective approach to aid distribution has spread rapidly with increasing use of
performance-based allocation at the World Bank and other donor organizations (Clemens et al.,
2004, 8).  President Bush’s initiative to increase U.S. foreign aid by 50% through the
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) is the most direct implementation of this concept.2
Not surprisingly, this attempt to justify reducing the role of need in aid allocation has
sparked a strong response in the academic community.  While researchers have taken a variety of
approaches (see, for example, the August 2001 issue of The Journal of Development Studies),
most compelling  are empirical critiques which demonstrate that the BD results are not robust
across different specifications, time periods or country samples (Clemens et al., 2004; Dalgaard
et al., 2004; Easterly, 2003; Easterly et al., 2004; Hansen and Tarp, 2000, 2001).  The central
theme of this research is that the empirical foundations of aid selectivity are far too fragile to
justify such a major policy shift.
The question of whether aid facilitates specific types of reform is beginning to be
explored empirically.3  Remmer (2004) looks at government size as measured by the ratio of
4Controlling for openness, demographics, GDP per capita, debt service ratio, and government
revenue as a share of GDP.
5Timing is when the first privatization takes place; pace is the number of privatizations in a given
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government expenditures to GDP to see how it relates to aid.  Particularly since the debt crisis of
the 1980s and the rise of the “Washington Consensus,” reducing the size of government has been
a frequent donor refrain (Williamson, 1990, 2003).  The argument that aid may increase rather
than decrease the size of government is much the same as presented above:  donors only weakly
demand fiscal discipline while they actually provide the government with the means of
expansion.  Taking a public choice perspective, Remmer states “the notion that augmenting the
resources of a government from outside may reduce or have no systematic effect on government
size is intrinsically implausible.  The reason is that the political costs and benefits of
expenditures financed by external resources and those funded by domestic taxation or revenue
generation differ significantly” (Remmer, 2004, 80).  The assumption that the latter are higher is
equivalent to the argument that aid conditions have no teeth.  Remmer also echos the strategic
non-reformer view, suggesting that aid dependent countries may expect to leverage fiscal deficits
into more future aid.  Remmer uses panel data (1970-1999 for 120 nations) on government
spending as a share of GDP, tax effort and aid (alternatively as a share of GNI, government
spending, and imports) to estimate error-correction models of government spending and tax
effort.4  Estimation results show that aid is associated with increased public spending (apparently
consumption not investment) and decreased tax effort.  These results are consistent with BD and
Devarajan et al. (2001).
Examining another stated goal of aid, Banerjee and Rondinelli (2003) estimate the impact
of aid on the timing, pace and intensity of privatization in a group of 35 developing countries.5 
year; and intensity is the value (in constant dollars) of privatizations in a year.
6The authors use the phrase “no systematic impact” to describe results that differ by specification
and measure of aid but go on to discuss individual specifications or measures of aid that do have
statistically significant results.
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Banerjee and Rondinelli also note the two roles that aid can play in privatization: donors can
force aid dependent governments to undertake privatization but aid funds may also directly or
indirectly subsidize hemorrhaging state-owned enterprises and thereby postpone privatization. 
The authors test for aid endogeneity (e.g., more aid allocated to countries that privatize) but fail
to reject exogeneity.  The estimation results are difficult to interpret for a number of reasons:  1)
the negative binomial specification for pace requires the improbable assumption that each
privatization is an independent event; 2) results vary widely across specifications and measures
of aid6; and 3) pace and intensity are not measured relative to the size of the economy.  The
authors take several lessons away from this empirical exercise.  In general, the role of aid in
privatization is limited primarily to technical assistance supporting an ongoing process.  For
countries with “superior governance structures,” aid may play a more important part (Banerjee
and Rondinelli, 2003, 1546).  Aid, however, does not appear to have a systematic influence on
the decision to begin the privatization process.
The impact of aid on corruption has also been studied using aggregate cross-country data. 
Alesina and Weder (2002) find weak evidence of a “voracity effect” (Lane and Tornell,
1996)–increases in corruption contemporaneously associated with increases in aid even when
including lagged values of each variable.  In an attempt to deal better with endogeneity
(corruption or its effects causing aid flows), Tavares (2003) instruments aid using measures of
7See for example Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Diamond (1997), Easterly and Levine (2003),
Fleck and Hanssen (2003), Rodrik et al. (2002), Sachs (2003).
8Svensson uses the Fraser Institute’s “Freedom from Government Regulation” (fgr) measure as
the dependent variable in this estimation (Column 2b in Table 2).  It appears that fgr is inverted to make it
consistent with the other proxies for rent-seeking activities so that higher values indicate more regulation.
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cultural and geographical proximity between donors and recipients.  The results appear to show
that aid reduces corruption since countries with high values of the instrumented aid are less
corrupt according to the both the ICRG measure and the Business International index.  While
this two stage approach is undoubtably the right method, it is not clear that the instruments
selected are exogenous to corruption.  The recent (and hotly debated) literature on colonization,
institutions and growth links a similar set of indicators to institutional quality.7  Thus, Tavares’
instrumented aid may proxy for institutional quality which itself is linked to lower levels of
corruption.
As Svensson (2000A) points out, corruption and regulation are tightly linked.  Regulation
that restricts competition generates rents; competition for these rents results in corruption. 
Indeed, politicians and government officials may design regulations specifically to create rents
and the ensuing corruption.  Svensson’s main focus is on corruption and aid but, because of this
link between regulation and corruption, he estimates an equation for regulation and aid as a
robustness check.8  To allow for aid endogeneity, Svensson uses a 2SLS method with log of
population as the instrument for aid.  The variables included in this regression are an index of
ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ethnic), windfalls as measured by aid plus terms of trade shocks
(aid+tt), primary product exports as a share of GDP (sxp), log of initial real per capita GDP
9ethnic reflects values in 1960.  It “measures the probability that two randomly selected people in
a country belong to different ethnolinguistic groups.”  Terms of trade shocks (tt) are measured by “the
average growth rate of dollar export prices times initial share of exports in GDP minus the average
growth rate of import prices times initial share of imports to GDP,” a variable from the World
Development Indicators (Svensson, 2000A, 458).
10The interaction term (ethnic*(aid+tt)) is instrumented with ethnic interacted with time and
regional dummies (Svensson 452, fn 10).
11Because Svensson uses initial income level at the start of the period, changes in regulation over
the period are not driving this result.  However, it may still be the case that regulation prior to the start of
the period influences the initial GDP and subsequent regulation (because of persistence).
12As I interpret the results.  Reported results for regression 2b contain 2 apparent errors–negative
coefficient estimates with positive t-statistics ((aid+tt)*ethnic and centam).  The inverting of fgr
mentioned above might explain the sign error typos.  Given the other estimates in adjacent equations, the
signs of the standard errors and Svensson’s discussion, it is clear the negative signs are simply typos.
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(lgdp), regional dummies and time dummies.9  The specification also includes interactions of
ethnic with both aid+tt and sxp.10  Ethnolinguistic fractionalization is intended to capture the
extent of divisions within a society which, in Svensson’s model, lead to more regulation.  Below
I discuss the significant results.
lgdp enters negatively and significantly, indicating that higher income levels are linked to
less regulation.11  To gauge the effects of ethnic fractionalization and “windfalls” (aid plus terms
of trade shocks), we need to look at both the direct effect and the interaction term.  More
regulation is linked to higher ethnic fractionalization only for large windfalls–about three times
the mean value.  On the other hand, regulation increases with aid for all values of ethnic
fractionalization.12  Thus, windfalls increase regulatory burden, more so in divided societies. 
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One would expect to get similar results using aid separately.
Harms and Lutz (2003) examine how the link between aid and private foreign
investment–FDI broadly defined to include portfolio investment–is influenced by the
institutional environment (i.e., aspects of governance) in the recipient country.  Their central
result is that aid is linked to higher levels of private foreign investment in economies with a high
regulatory burden.  This appears to run counter to the central theme in BD and Assessing Aid that
aid is only effective in “good policy” environments (e.g., low regulatory burden).  Harms and
Lutz’ measure of regulatory burden is taken from Kaufmann et al. (1999); a single measure is
used across the decade examined on the assumption that the regulatory environment changes
only slowly.  Using the same instruments as BD, Harms and Lutz also cannot reject the
hypothesis that aid is exogenous in their investment equation.
A number of interesting lessons and possibilities are raised by this literature.  First,
donors may consider the level of regulation in aid allocation.  Likewise, aid may influence the
level of regulation.  As stated above, donors may use ex post conditionality (selectivity) giving
aid preferentially to countries with “good policies,” in this case, low levels of regulation. 
Alternatively, donors may give more funds to highly regulated economies, either because the ill
effects of excess regulation mean that those economies also need more aid or because donors
hope to “buy reform” and reduce regulation through ex ante conditionality (traditional structural
adjustment).  Although empirical evidence of endogeneity is mixed, we must examine these
issues.
Looking across the literature, a number of good instruments for regulation and aid
present themselves. BD estimate an aid allocation equation (Table 8) which includes variables
intended to reflect donors’ economic and strategic motives for aid allocation.  Some of these
13Regarding arms imports, they state:  “To capture strategic interests we also use a measure of
arms imports relative to total imports lagged one period. This variable helps explain the allocation of aid
to middle-income countries, but has only minor relevance in the low-income country data set” (BD, 26-7).
14Interestingly, these variables are included in BD’s aid allocation equation because they view
them as exogenous to growth.
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prove insignificant including membership in the Franc Zone (so called CFA countries) and arms
imports as a share of overall imports.13  The first is intended to measure links to France while the
second may reflect alliances with donors such as the United States and its close allies; both are
expected to result in more aid but prove insignificant.  However, even if these are unrelated to
aid allocation, there is reason to suppose they could be related to the level of regulation. 
Particularly during the late 1980s and early 1990s, CFA countries experienced severe
macroeconomic problems because of exchange rate misalignment.  Governments in CFA
countries may attempt to counteract resulting imbalances via regulation.  A high value for arms
imports as a share of total imports suggests a repressive regime, one likely associated with
widespread corruption and regulation.  The mechanism for this may follow Svensson’s
description of a highly divided society (following a similar story as ethnolinguistic
fractionalization) or may simply be the result of the approach of a repressive regime.14  In short,
BD show these are unrelated to aid allocation while Svensson’s work suggests they (and ethnic)
may be linked to kleptocracy and hence to corruption and regulatory burden.
Svensson also provides an instrument for aid, namely population.  Although we measure
aid as a share of GDP, research on aid allocation has long shown a bias against large countries. 
A number of explanations have been offered for this pattern.  A minimum efficient scale for aid
operations due to fixed administrative costs may result in very small countries getting
15Gwartney et al. (2003). This is the same measure used by Svensson (2000A).  In the Fraser
Institute’s documentation, this rating is called “Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business.”
16Other available measures of regulation (e.g., the Wall Street Journal/Heritage Foundation
regulation variable and an index developed by Kaufmann et al. (2003)) provide only very short time
series.
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disproportionate levels of aid.  At the other end of the spectrum, donors significantly under fund
large recipient countries, apparently so that their aid programs (and hence influence) reach a
larger number of countries.  In the case of international financial institutions, such a strategy
limits the amount of leverage large recipient countries have over them.
 III.  Data and Model
I draw mainly on two existing data sets to examine the links between aid and regulation. 
The primary measure of regulation comes from the Fraser Institute and is an aggregate measure
of “Freedom from Government Regulation” (FGR).15  The variable can range from 0 (low
freedom from government regulation = high regulation) to 10 (high freedom from government
regulation = low regulation) and is available for 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and
2001 though not all years are available for all countries.  This is one of five component indices
averaged together to generate the Fraser Institute’s “Economic Freedom of the World” index. 
FGR is itself an aggregate of fifteen sub-indices, five each related to credit market regulation,
labor market regulation, and business regulation.16
Other variables come directly from the data set posted by Easterly, Levine, and Roodman
(2003–henceforth ELR).  These include the measure of aid (AID) used by ELR, an extension of
the Effective Development Assistance measure (EDA) developed by Chang, Fernandez-Arias
and Serven (1998) and used by BD.  While the standard measure of aid (Official Development
17The threshold for ODA is 35% in the case of mixed credits, e.g., where concessional finance
funds are packaged with a commercial contract.  While there is some debate about the relative merits of
EDA in analyzing growth, it does seem a reasonable measure when considering issues of conditionality.
18Past research has explored using aid as a share of the government budget or other refinements. 
These alternate approaches by-and-large yield the same results as aid/GDP (e.g., Remmer, 2004). 
Typically, the distribution of residuals is closer to a normal distribution if we take logs.  In the aid models
reported below, we cannot reject the assumption of normality.  For example, using specification Aid 6
(Table 2, column 3) yields the following p-values for various tests of normality:  Skewness test: 0.214;
Kurtosis test: 0.139; Joint Skewness/Kurtosis test: 0.153; Shapiro-Wilk W test: 0.511; Shapiro-Francia W'
test: 0.248.  Taking logs drops 13 observations with non-positive aid values, values that are difficult to
interpret in any case.
19This does not directly include a measure of regulation though one of its sources is ICRG data;
other variables from this database are used in constructing indices such as Kaufmann et al. (2003)
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Assistance or ODA) lumps concessional loans together with grants if the loan’s grant element
exceeds 25%, EDA converts these loans to their grant equivalent and thus provides a better
measure of long term resource flows.17 However, EDA and ODA are highly correlated and
research results thus far do not depend on which measure is used (e.g., BD).  Aid is measured as
a percentage of GDP to reflect the relative importance of aid to the recipient government.  I use
the natural log of period averages.18
The remaining variables mirror those used by BD and ELR; again, the data come directly
from ELR (2003).  POLICY is an aggregate measure of policy constructed by BD and extended
by ELR.19  Several regional and country dummy variables are included:  Sub Saharan Africa
(SSA), East Asia (EASIA), EGYPT, and Central America (CENTAM).  I refer to these
collectively as REGIONS.  In addition, I include the log per capita GDP (in constant dollars) at
20The aid allocation literature is actually split on the interpretation of this variable with some
authors claiming that it reflects need and others suggesting it may proxy for economic importance, e.g., as
a market for donor exports.
21To confirm the role of CFA, I implement an overidentification test (e.g., Wooldridge 2003,
508).  I use ARMS_1 as an instrument for FGR in the aid equation (Aid 6, Table 2) and test for the
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the start of each period (GDP_CAP) and the log of population (POP).  Finally, three variables
previously discussed are an indicator for CFA countries (CFA), imports of military equipment as
a share of total imports lagged by one period (ARMS_1), and an index of ethnolinguistic
fractionalization in 1960 (ETHNIC).  All of these variables are drawn from ELR.  All equations
include unreported time dummies for each period except the first.
It may be appropriate to include POLICY along with FGR (or other measures of
regulation) in an aid equation since the latter might proxy for the former.  The country and
regional dummy variables were proposed by BD to reflect donor economic and strategic
interests.  GDP_CAP may reflect recipient need and hence play an important role in aid
allocation.20  See above for discussion of the roles of POP, CFA, ARMS_1, and ETHNIC.
The basic specifications proposed above are:
AIDit="0+"1FGRit+"2POLICYit+"3GDP_CAPit+"4POPit+"5REGIONSi+git (1)
FGRit=$0+$1AIDit+$2ARMS_1it+$3ETHNICi+$4CFAi+$5GDP_CAPit+$6REGIONSi+.it (2)
Endogeneity is an issue if "1 and $1 are non-zero.  Note that, contrary to BD, I include CFA and
ARMS_1 not in aid equation (1) but in regulation equation (2).  I have proposed different
interpretations of these variables and capitalized on their insignificance in the aid equation (both
here and in BD and ELR).  Because of the potential for simultaneity, I include estimation of (1)
and (2) using instrumental variables methods.21
exogeneity of CFA.  The auxiliary regression yields nR2=1.16 as compared to P21,.05=3.84 (p-value = .28)
and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that CFA is exogenous.
22For both FGR and POLICY, higher values indicate “better” policy, i.e., less regulation in the
case of FGR and a higher index of openness, lower inflation, and better fiscal policy in the case of
POLICY.
23This includes some donors pursuing conditionality while others pursue selectivity.  The analysis
in this paper looks at aggregate donor behavior; individual donors may follow a variety of strategies.
24Note, however, that I test and reject the exogeneity of POLICY as an instrument for AID in the
regulation equation.
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The expected signs of the estimated coefficients are clear in some cases but not in others. 
For both FGR and POLICY, we may observe positive, zero or negative signs in the aid
equation.22  If donors target countries with highly regulated economies either because these
countries “need more help” or because donors aspire to promote policy reform through
traditional conditionality, then "1<0.  Conversely, if selectivity dominates, "1>0.  Finally, if
donors either ignore regulation issues when allocating aid or pursue different strategies in
different settings, we may find "1=0.23  We can tell similar stories for POLICY.  While these
two variables are correlated (D=.42), they do measure different characteristics of recipient
countries and it is possible that donors take different approaches for each.  Finally, note that
POLICY may be endogenous.  BD reject the endogeneity of POLICY (and, indeed, this is the
basis for the selectivity approach to aid allocation); I take the simplified approach of estimating
the aid equation with and without POLICY.24
Although there are competing interpretations, one might reasonably expect GDP_CAP to
reflect recipient need in the aid equation and hence enter negatively as it does in BD.  A bias
25This statement is a bit too strong since expectations about regulation during the period could
certainly influence income.
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against large countries would be reflected in a negative coefficient on POP (recall we are
looking at aid/GDP, not the absolute amount of aid) as in BD and Alesina and Dollar (2000). 
The various REGIONS might be expected to receive more aid as they are ostensibly of strategic
and economic importance to major donors.  That said, there are in fact many possible
interpretations for what these dummy variables reflect.
Turning to the regulation equation, the above literature review suggests AID may enter
positively, negatively or not at all.  If conditionality succeeds or aid provides critical resources
(technical assistance or transitional support), we expect $1>0.  If aid does not promote
deregulation in aggregate (it fails or deregulation was never a serious objective of donors), $1=0. 
Finally, $1<0 if aid resources facilitate continued regulation or even actively promote the
expansion of the state through development planning.
Svensson (2000A) presents an argument for ETHNIC entering negatively; by extension,
ARMS_1 and CFA should also enter negatively.  Other interpretations of these variables are
possible but also suggest a link with more rather than less regulation (i.e., lower values of FGR). 
GDP_CAP is likely to enter positively though the direction of causation is controversial.  Much
of the research on the indices produced by the Fraser Institute has focused on how these various
aspects of “Economic Freedom” may promote growth and hence be linked indirectly to higher
incomes.  However, when considering income itself, it is also plausible that “Economic
Freedom” is a normal good, the consumption of which rises with income (Hanson 2003).  As in
Svensson (2000A), GDP_CAP is the initial value at the start of the period so that it could not be
influenced directly by current regulation (FGR).25  However, because the level of regulation is
26FGR_1 is FGR lagged by one period (5 years).  The short length of the time series (maximum 6
periods, median 4 periods) prevents a meaningful exploration of the time series characteristics of the data
even with relatively strong assumptions across countries in the panel (e.g., Levin et al., 2002).
27For a good summary of these methods, see Cook and Uchida (2003).
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relatively persistent over time (D(FGR,FGR_1)=.76), I explore including FGR_1 as an
explanatory variable.26  Finally, the various REGIONS variables may capture broadly different
patterns of regulation across regions not already captured by the other explanatory variables.
The sample covers 71 countries over five year periods from 1970 to 1995 although not all
periods are available for all countries.  The total number of observations is 306, an average of 4
periods per country but going as low as 1 and as high as 6.  When I include POLICY in the aid
equation, the sample falls to 257 observations on 66 countries due to missing observations for
POLICY.  When I include the previous period’s regulation (FGR_1) as an explanatory variable
in the regulation equation, the sample falls to 236 observations on 70 countries.  Finally, because
the influence and identification of outliers has been a controversial issue (see ELR), I examine
several methods to exclude outliers. With aid in log form, the method used by BD and ELR
(Hadi, 1994) finds no potential outliers.  DFITS, Cook’s Distance, and Welsch Distance methods
do find potential outliers; the group identified by DFITS contains the others.27  Dropping these
leaves 239 observations (66 countries) in the aid equation which includes POLICY and 222
observations (69 countries) in the regulation equation which includes FGR_1.
The appendix provides details on the data used.  Table A1 lists countries and coverage
periods.  Basic descriptive statistics are in Table A2 and simple correlations in Table A3. All
three tables cover the overall sample except where noted.
28If we do not take the log of aid, FGR is negative and significant even in the OLS specifications. 
However, these specifications fail normality tests.
29Recall that AID, GDP_CAP, and POP are all in logs.  Define aid=level of aid to country,
GDP=level of GDP, and pop=level of population.  Then AID/ln(aid/GDP), GDP_CAP/ln(GDP/pop)
and POP/ln(pop).  Ignoring other variables in equation (1), AID="3GDP_CAP+"4POP can be rewritten
as ln(aid)=(1+"3)ln(GDP)+(!"3+"4)ln(pop).  Thus, the elasticity of aid with respect to GDP=1+"3 and,
18
IV.  Estimation Results
Table 1 presents OLS estimation results for two specifications of each equation.  The first
column (Aid 1) excludes POLICY.  The second column (Aid 2) also excludes POLICY but
uses the same, smaller sample as column 3.  The third column (Aid 3) includes POLICY.  The
second set of columns follow a similar pattern for the regulation equation.  Regulation 1
excludes FGR_1, Regulation 2 excludes FGR_1 but uses the same, smaller sample as the next
column.  Regulation 3 includes FGR_1.  This approach demonstrates which changes are due to
specification and which to sample.  I use this approach throughout because of the issues raised in
ELR.  I use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (allowing for country clusters) to construct
the reported t-statistics.
[Table 1 about here]
Results of all three OLS aid allocation estimations are consistent.  “Freedom from
government regulation” (FGR) is insignificant at all conventional confidence levels.28 
GDP_CAP enters negatively and is significantly less than !1, in line with the “need”
interpretation of GDP per capita.29  POP is negative and significant, mirroring previous evidence
ceteris paribus, aid allocation follows recipient need if "3<!1.  One-sided tests of H0: "3=!1 v. H1:"3<!1
reject null hypothesis in favor of recipient need in all specifications run.
30Note that the Fraser ratings have a separate category for trade restrictions so this is not simply
driven by trade policies which restrict overall imports and thus raise the share of arms imports.
31The estimated coefficient remains positive if ARMS_1 is omitted.  The simple correlation
between FGR and ETHNIC is negative in the regression sample (D= !0.1335, n=306).
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of a bias against large countries.  Where significant, the regional variables are positive as we
would expect if they capture strategic significance as posited in BD.  Reducing the sample from
306 observations in Aid 1 to 257 observations in Aid 2 results in only small changes in the
estimated coefficients.  Aid 3 introduces POLICY as an additional explanatory variable. 
Consistent with BD and Alesina and Dollar (2000), this variable is insignificant, suggesting that
aid is not consistently allocated to “good policy” countries.  The introduction of POLICY has a
minimal impact on other coefficient estimates.
In the regulation equations, results for the central variables are again consistent across the
three estimations in terms of sign and significance although the inclusion of the lagged
dependent variable has a sizeable impact on magnitude.  AID enters positively and significantly;
ceteris paribus, more aid is associated with less regulation.  This suggests that aid may promote
deregulation either through conditionality or providing critical resources.  ARMS_1 enters
negatively and significantly with a higher share of arms imports linked to more regulation.  This
result is consistent and strong across all specifications estimated (both reported and
unreported).30  ETHNIC enters positively but is insignificant, again a result which holds across
all specifications. This is something of a puzzle given Svensson’s theoretical and empirical
results.31  CFA enters negatively and significantly as expected: CFA countries face a
32Svensson (2000A) includes the same measure of GDP per capita in his regulation equation
without FGR_1.  However, his specification is IV with random country effects (454).
33Instruments for FGR in the aid equation are ARMS_1, ETHNIC, and CFA.  An
overidentification test (Wooldridge 2003, 508) for ETHNIC and CFA yields nR2=2.50 as compared to
P22,.05=5.99 (p=.29) for Aid 4 and nR2=4.98 (p=.08) for Aid 6.  The only instrument used for AID in the
regulation equation is POP; the overidenification test for POLICY rejects exogenous (nR2=19.17,
P21,.05=3.84, p=.00001 for Regulation 4; nR2=16.96, p=.00004 for Regulation 6).
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significantly higher regulatory burden even compared to other Sub-Saharan African countries. 
GDP_CAP enters positively; higher levels of income are associated with significantly higher
“Freedom from Regulation” scores.  Finally, ceteris paribus, there is still regional variation in
levels of regulation.
Regulation 2 differs from Regulation 1 in two respects.  First, the sample is reduced by
70 observations to match that used in Regulation 3 (which includes the lagged dependent
variable).  Second, the reduced sample means no observations for the first time period so the
number of period dummies drops from 5 to 4.  As the Regulation 2 results show, the estimation
is not sensitive to the reduced sample.  Regulation 3 includes FGR_1 to allow for persistence
over time which the coefficient on GDP_CAP might otherwise reflect.32  As one would expect,
introducing FGR_1 substantially reduces the magnitudes of the key coefficient estimates, by
56% for AID, 61% for ARMS_1, 36% for CFA, and 62% for GDP_CAP.  However, as noted
above, the sign and significance of these variables does not change.
Table 2 addresses endogeneity issues via instrumental variables.33  Because FGR enters
the aid equation negatively and AID enters the regulation equation positively, there is the
possibility of a bias toward zero in both coefficient estimates when ignoring endogeneity. 
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Comparing estimates across tables 4 and 5 for comparable samples and specifications, the
pattern is consistent with this.  The estimated coefficients in the IV specifications are further
from zero than those from OLS, in some cases by a considerable margin.
[Table 2 about here]
The estimated coefficient for instrumented FGR in Aid 4 (column 1) is substantially
larger and now statistically significant.  While OLS may conflate the impact of aid with donor
allocation, the instrumental variables method allows us to identify where regulation is high for
exogenous reasons.  The negative, significant coefficient on instrumented FGR implies that
countries where regulation is high for exogenous reasons receive more aid.  The IV method has
little impact on the other variables in the equation; GDP_CAP and POP enter negatively and
significantly with coefficient estimates of approximately the same magnitude.
Turning to Aid 5 and 6 (columns 2 and 3), there are few changes.  Reducing the sample
to those countries and periods where policy data are available (Aid 5) has very little impact. 
Including POLICY (Aid 6) increases the impact of regulation on aid somewhat but has little
impact on coefficients.  The estimated coefficient for POLICY is substantially larger than
without instrumenting (Aid 3) and now statistically significant.  This implies that preferential aid
allocation to countries with “good policy,” in contrast to the findings of BD as well as Alesina
and Dollar (2000).
The instrumental variables estimates for the regulation equation (Regulation 4 through 6)
are quite similar to the OLS estimates in Table 1.  With or without instrumenting, AID is
positive and significant in all three specifications though with a much smaller estimated
34Starting with Aid 4 as the base, the sample without DFITS outliers is 286 and FGR is again
22
coefficient in the specification including the lagged dependent variable (Regulation 3 or 6).  
Point estimates for the AID coefficient are somewhat larger when instrumented (from 28% to
65% larger) though naturally the standard errors are also larger.  These results appear to be clear
evidence that countries where aid is high for exogenous reasons have lower levels of regulation. 
Estimates for other variables are virtually unchanged by instrumenting.
The results presented thus far provide strong support for the hypothesis that donors target
high regulation economies and that aid is effective in reducing regulation.  Donor targeting is
apparent once we control for the endogeneity of regulation (i..e, in IV estimations); aid’s ability
to reduce regulation stands whether we instrument or not.  Furthermore, the results are robust to
dropping a substantial fraction of the observations, 15% of the countries/years missing POLICY
data in the Aid equation and 20% (the first time period) in the regulation equation.
However, a note of caution is appropriate.  Past research using cross-country data has
shown that results can be sensitive to sample (e.g., BD as compared to ELR).  Although the
method described by Hadi (1994)–seemingly the standard in cross-country aid regressions–does
not identify any potential outliers, DFITS, Cook’s Distance, and Welsch Distance methods do
with the group identified by DFITS containing the others.  The last columns of Table 2 (Aid 7
and Regulation 7) give results under the toughest standard, dropping points identified by DFITS. 
The most striking change is that the estimated coefficients for FGR in the aid equation and AID
in the regulation equation shrink dramatically in absolute value and are no longer statistically
significant.  While this is a harsh test–selecting the most extreme of four methods and
successively whittling the sample down from the original 306 observations to 239 for Aid and
222 for Regulation–it does indicate results that are somewhat sensitive to sample.34
insignificant.  However, starting with Regulation 4, the sample without DFITS outliers is 292 but AID is
significant.  The coefficient estimate is in line with that in the larger sample (0.216) as is the t-statistic
(2.65).
35Estimation methods do not account for differences with Svensson (2000A).  Re-estimating
Regulation 4 and 6 from Table 2 with random effects and instruments yields results in line with those
reported above including positive, insignificant coefficients on ETHNIC and positive, significant
coefficients on AID.  Svensson’s negative link between regulation and ethnolinguistic fractionalization is
captured by the interaction of ethnic with aid+tt when the latter is very high, an issue not explored in this
paper.  However, Svennson finds that regulation increases with aid for all values of ethnic, in contrast to
results reported here.
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With this caveat noted, a quick scan of Tables 1 and 2 underscores that the results are
relatively robust.  For the period examined, the IV aid specifications point toward aid
conditionality rather than selectivity as more aid flows to more heavily regulated economies. 
This is not surprising as support for selectivity is only now spreading in policy circles.  Other
result are more surprising.  Once we account for the endogeneity of regulation, aid appears to
reward “good policy”–even in Regulation 7 using our stringent method to exclude outliers.  With
the exception of Regulation 7, all regulation results find aid effective in reducing the level of
regulation.  Finally, the degree of ethnic fractionalization (ETHNIC) is positive but insignificant
in every specification, unlike in Svensson (2000A).35
V.  Conclusion
As the debate over governance and aid unfolds, empirical research is moving from more
general issues and measures of governance to the examination of specific attributes.  The degree
of government intervention in the economy via regulation is undoubtably one of the most direct
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and important aspects of governance as it pertains to economic performance (World Bank,
2004).  Deregulation is a central component of the policy reforms advocated and supported by
the major international development agencies.  A better understanding of the multiple links
between aid and regulation is critical to the successful implementation of such reforms.
There are many reasons to think the links between aid and regulation are complex and
bidirectional.  Although there is no shortage of theories in the literature about the links between
aid, regulation, corruption, and policy reform more generally, sorting out the actual relationship
is fundamentally an empirical question.  This paper attacks the problem using cross-country
panel data on aid and regulation for 71 countries from 1970 to 1995.
The results presented in this paper provide strong evidence that donors allocate more aid
to countries with high regulatory burden and that aid reduces the level of regulation.  This
finding of apparently effective conditionality contrasts with much of the research on structural
adjustment in general which finds lax enforcement of conditions and little improvement in
recipient behavior (e.g., Mosley et al., 1995).  It may be that the leverage of conditionality on
and the resources to provide support for deregulation have been more effective than for other
aspects of structural adjustment.
Another related result is surprising in light of past research.  While an index of policy is
not a significant determinant of aid allocation in BD or Alesina and Dollar (2000), the same
index is robust, positive, and significant in the aid allocation equation in this paper once we
instrument for regulation.  This works in the opposite direction from regulation–more “freedom
from government regulation” means less aid but better policies mean more aid–although the two
variables are closely connected (D(FGR,POLICY)=.40).  If we estimate the aid equation
without regulation, the results conform to BD–policy is not a significant factor in aid allocation.
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This suggests an interesting possibility.  The typical “non result” may be driven by
incorrectly aggregating two aspects of policy.  If regulation conditionality works, donors should
use it and hence allocate more funds to highly regulated countries.  If other policy conditionality
does not work, donors should be selective and allocate more funds to countries that have already
improved these aspects of policy.  Putting the two elements together, we get aggregate aid
allocation that does not appear responsive to policy and aggregate policy which does not appear
very responsive to aid.
At a minimum, this discussion underscores the broader importance of understanding the
links between aid and regulation.  The intellectual case for more intensive selectivity–the current
direction of World Bank lending and the core of President Bush’s $5 billion MCA
initiative–fundamentally is built on claims that aid has not been responsive to policy and policy
has not been responsive to aid.  Clearly, a more disaggregate analysis is appropriate.
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Table 1:  OLS Estimation
Aid 1 Aid 2 Aid 3
AID Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
FGR !0.051 !0.32 !0.001 !0.00 !0.057 !0.33
POLICY 0.168 1.66
GDP_CAP !1.990 !8.82** !2.065 !8.78** !2.081 !8.79 **
POP !0.743 !7.08** !0.747 !6.11** !0.719 !5.85 **
SSA !0.575 !1.49 !0.623 !1.49 !0.574 !1.37
EASIA 0.311 1.15 0.348 1.21 0.139 0.41
EGYPT 1.882 7.78** 1.919 7.66** 1.847 6.93 **
CENTAM !0.079 !0.24 !0.049 !0.13 0.023 0.06
R-squared 0.722 0.715 0.720
N 306 257 257
Period Dummies 5 5 5
Method OLS OLS OLS
Regulation 1 Regulation 2 Regulation 3
FGR Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
AID 0.156 2.79 ** 0.147 2.54 ** 0.064 2.42 **
FGR_1 0.654 9.99 **
ARMS_1 !4.777 !6.42 ** !4.680 !6.26 ** !1.836 !4.22 **
ETHNIC 0.203 0.60 0.141 0.42 0.042 0.33
CFA !0.396 !1.80 * !0.490 !2.28 ** !0.312 !4.15 **
GDP_CAP 0.626 4.76 ** 0.630 4.85 ** 0.241 3.77 **
SSA 0.124 0.51  0.136 0.57  !0.041 !0.48
EASIA 0.133 0.44 0.170 0.58 0.179 2.12 **
EGYPT !0.033 !0.17 !0.095 !0.49 0.156 1.88 * 
CENTAM 0.638 2.67 ** 0.717 3.27 ** 0.252 1.71 * 
R-squared 0.374 0.436 0.714
N 306 236 236
Period Dummies 5 4 4
Method OLS OLS OLS
Robust t-statistics using country clusters.
* 10% significance level
** 5% significance level
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Table 2:  Instrumental Variables Estimation
Aid 4 Aid 5 Aid 6 Aid 7
AID Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
FGR !0.798 !3.13** !0.748 !2.55** !0.876 !2.85 ** !0.131 !0.49
POLICY 0.447 2.56 ** 0.215 1.72 * 
GDP_CAP !1.741 !6.98** !1.829 !6.75** !1.880 !6.66 ** !1.987 !11.57 **
POP !0.861 !5.47** !0.879 !4.75** !0.800 !4.73 ** !0.622 !6.74 **
SSA !0.500 !1.06 !0.511 !1.01 !0.384 !0.76 !0.340 !1.26
EASIA 0.678 1.81* 0.699 1.78* 0.135 0.27  0.033 0.13  
EGYPT 1.901 5.60** 1.892 5.28** 1.702 4.39 ** 1.707 7.80 **
CENTAM 0.405 1.27 0.260 0.75 0.442 1.36 0.225 0.97
R-squared 0.603 0.601 0.599 0.813
N 306 257 257 239
Period Dummies 5 5 5 5
Method IV IV IV IV
Regulation 4 Regulation 5 Regulation 6 Regulation 7
FGR Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
AID 0.235 2.82 ** 0.242 2.86 ** 0.082 2.17 ** 0.018 0.59
FGR_1 0.648 9.72 ** 0.750 18.44 **
ARMS_1 !5.015 !5.98 ** !4.980 !5.69 ** !1.915 !4.07 ** !1.386 !4.64 **
ETHNIC 0.304 0.91 0.268 0.81 0.066 0.51 0.058 0.50
CFA !0.460 !2.01 ** !0.562 !2.44 ** !0.327 !4.03 ** !0.322 !5.03 **
GDP_CAP 0.740 4.07 ** 0.760 4.35 ** 0.268 3.38 ** 0.160 3.14 **
SSA 0.069 0.30 0.052 0.24 !0.055 !0.64 !0.031 !0.38
EASIA 0.134 0.45 0.173 0.60 0.179 2.12 ** 0.202 3.23 **
EGYPT !0.081 !0.45 0.038 0.21 0.145 1.75 * 0.227 3.53 ** 
CENTAM 0.572 2.36 ** 0.636 2.90 ** 0.242 1.65 0.184 3.15 **
R-squared 0.364 0.421 0.713 0.822
N 306 236 236 222
Period Dummies 5 4 4 4
Method IV IV IV IV
Robust t-statistics using country clusters.
* 10% significance level
** 5% significance level
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Appendix
Table A1:  Sample Coverage
Country Coverage Periods Country Coverage Periods
Argentina 1970 1985 4
Burundi 1975 1995 5
Benin 1980 1995 4
Bolivia 1980 1995 3
Brazil 1970 1995 4
Barbados 1980 1990 3
Botswana 1980 1995 4
Central African Rep. 1985 1995 3
Chile 1975 1995 5
Cote d'Ivoire 1980 1995 4
Cameroon 1980 1995 4
Congo, Rep. 1980 1995 4
Colombia 1980 1995 4
Costa Rica 1975 1995 5
Dominican Republic 1980 1995 4
Algeria 1990 1995 2
Ecuador 1980 1995 4
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1980 1995 4
Gabon 1980 1995 4
Ghana 1975 1995 5
Guatemala 1970 1995 6
Guyana 1995 1995 1
Honduras 1980 1995 4
Haiti 1990 1995 2
Indonesia 1970 1995 6
India 1970 1995 6
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1980 1995 4
Jamaica 1980 1995 4
Jordan 1970 1995 6
Kenya 1970 1995 6
Korea, Rep. 1975 1990 4
Sri Lanka 1980 1995 4
Morocco 1980 1995 4
Madagascar 1970 1995 5
Mexico 1975 1995 4
Mali 1975 1995 5
Malta 1980 1995 4
Myanmar 1970 1995 6
Mauritius 1975 1995 5
Malawi 1975 1995 5
Malaysia 1970 1990 5
Niger 1975 1995 5
Nigeria 1975 1995 5
Nicaragua 1985 1995 3
Nepal 1980 1995 4
Pakistan 1970 1995 6
Panama 1975 1995 5
Peru 1980 1995 4
Philippines 1975 1995 5
Papua New Guinea 1980 1995 4
Paraguay 1990 1995 2
Rwanda 1975 1995 5
Senegal 1980 1995 4
Singapore 1970 1975 2
Sierra Leone 1975 1995 5
El Salvador 1985 1995 3
Syrian Arab Republic 1970 1995 6
Chad 1985 1995 3
Togo 1980 1995 4
Thailand 1970 1995 6
Trinidad and Tobago 1980 1995 4
Tunisia 1970 1995 6
Turkey 1975 1995 5
Tanzania 1970 1995 6
Uganda 1975 1995 5
Uruguay 1980 1995 4
Venezuela 1970 1985 4
South Africa 1995 1995 1
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1970 1995 6
Zambia 1975 1995 5
Zimbabwe 1980 1995 4
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Table A2:  Summary Statistics
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N Units/Scale
AID !0.583 !0.143 1.868 !6.502 2.545 306 log % of GDP
FGR 5.199 5.236 0.979 2.585 7.278 306 0 to 10
FGR_1 5.186 5.225 0.984 2.585 7.278 236 0 to 10
POLICY 1.520 1.273 1.068 !4.115 3.391 257 index
GDP_CAP 7.429 7.488 0.808 5.598 9.339 306 log of 1985 $
POP 16.170 16.046 1.459 12.423 20.659 306 log
ARMS_1 0.046 0.017 0.090 0 0.870 306 % of imports
ETHNIC 0.489 0.580 0.300 0 0.930 306 0 to 1
CFA 0.144 0 0.351 0 1 306 indicator
SSA 0.395 0 0.490 0 1 306 indicator
EASIA 0.092 0 0.289 0 1 306 indicator
EGYPT 0.013 0 0.114 0 1 306 indicator
CENTAM 0.085 0 0.279 0 1 306 indicator
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Table A3:  Simple Correlations
AID FGR GDP_CAP POP ARMS_1 ETHNIC CFA SSA EASIA EGYPT CENTAM
AID 1
FGR -0.13 1 306 observations
GDP_CAP -0.66 0.33 1
POP -0.36 -0.29 -0.18 1
ARMS_1 0.14 -0.41 -0.02 0.11 1
ETHNIC 0.16 -0.13 -0.44 0.26 -0.08 1
CFA 0.33 -0.14 -0.27 -0.23 -0.07 0.35 1
SSA 0.48 -0.15 -0.60 -0.21 -0.12 0.49 0.51 1
EASIA -0.21 0.08 0.12 0.29 -0.09 0.11 -0.13 -0.26 1
EGYPT 0.06 -0.04 0.01 0.12 0.08 -0.17 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 1
CENTAM 0.03 0.24 0.12 -0.21 0.00 -0.21 -0.12 -0.25 -0.10 -0.04 1
AID FGR POLICY GDP_CAP POP ARMS_1 ETHNIC CFA SSA EASIA EGYPT CENTAM
AID 1
FGR -0.07 1
POLICY -0.04 0.41 1 257 observations
GDP_CAP -0.66 0.29 0.30 1
POP -0.36 -0.31 -0.15 -0.17 1
ARMS_1 0.15 -0.43 -0.22 -0.05 0.10 1
ETHNIC 0.09 -0.07 -0.11 -0.36 0.28 -0.09 1
CFA 0.27 -0.11 -0.02 -0.22 -0.21 -0.07 0.32 1
SSA 0.43 -0.06 -0.20 -0.55 -0.24 -0.13 0.42 0.46 1
EASIA -0.19 0.07 0.34 0.12 0.28 -0.10 0.14 -0.12 -0.25 1
EGYPT 0.07 -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.09 -0.19 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 1
CENTAM 0.08 0.16 -0.02 0.07 -0.20 0.02 -0.20 -0.10 -0.22 -0.10 -0.04 1
AID FGR FGR_1 GDP_CAP POP ARMS_1 ETHNIC CFA SSA EASIA EGYPT CENTAM
AID 1
FGR -0.18 1 236 observations
FGR_1 -0.12 0.79 1
GDP_CAP -0.67 0.38 0.30 1
POP -0.34 -0.29 -0.34 -0.21 1
ARMS_1 0.17 -0.44 -0.40 -0.05 0.09 1
ETHNIC 0.17 -0.18 -0.11 -0.46 0.28 -0.08 1
CFA 0.33 -0.19 -0.08 -0.28 -0.22 -0.07 0.33 1
SSA 0.52 -0.21 -0.09 -0.62 -0.20 -0.10 0.50 0.50 1
EASIA -0.23 0.11 0.04 0.14 0.30 -0.11 0.12 -0.13 -0.26 1
EGYPT 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.12 0.09 -0.17 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 1
CENTAM 0.03 0.25 0.23 0.11 -0.21 0.01 -0.21 -0.12 -0.25 -0.10 -0.03 1
